Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241262 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Boston, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 996-1007
Verlag: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Boston, USA
Zusammenfassung: 
How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.
Schlagwörter: 
climate protection
default
experiment
motivation crowding
nudge
public good
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