Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237596
Authors: 
Daskalova, Vessela
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series No. WP21/18
Abstract: 
Players may categorize the strategies available to them. In many games there are different ways to categorize one's strategies (different frames) and which ones players use has implications for the outcomes realized. This paper proposes a model of agents who learn which frames to use through reinforcement. As a case study we fit the model to existing experimental data from coordination games. The analysis shows that the model fits the data well as it matches the key stylized facts. It suggests a trade-off of using coarser versus finer representations of the strategy set when it comes to learning.
Subjects: 
Variable Frame Theory
Coordination games
Categorization
Reinforcement learning
Focal points
Bounded rationality
JEL: 
C63
C72
C91
D9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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