Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237596
Autor:innen: 
Daskalova, Vessela
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Datum: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP21/18
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, UCD Centre for Economic Research, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
Players may categorize the strategies available to them. In many games there are different ways to categorize one's strategies (different frames) and which ones players use has implications for the outcomes realized. This paper proposes a model of agents who learn which frames to use through reinforcement. As a case study we fit the model to existing experimental data from coordination games. The analysis shows that the model fits the data well as it matches the key stylized facts. It suggests a trade-off of using coarser versus finer representations of the strategy set when it comes to learning.
Schlagwörter: 
Variable Frame Theory
Coordination games
Categorization
Reinforcement learning
Focal points
Bounded rationality
JEL: 
C63
C72
C91
D9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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