Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233730 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] The RAND Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1756-2171 [Volume:] 51 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 934-961
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We consider a preemption game between competing groups; firms lobbying individually for their groups' interests provide an empirical example. Among symmetric groups, the first firm to take action bears an (unobserved) cost and wins the prize on behalf of its group. In equilibrium, the firm with the lowest cost takes action, but with delay. More competition and a smaller ratio of costs to benefits reduce delay. Firms in larger groups wait longer, but group action can occur earlier, as the probability of a low-cost firm is higher. Asymmetries in group size or strength of externalities also matter.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.