Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230081 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] 22 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 320-337
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
Recent papers show that the all-pay auction is better at raising money for charity than the first-price auction with symmetric bidders under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework on charity auctions with asymmetric bidders under some incomplete information. We find that the all-pay auction still raises more money than the first-price auction. Thus, the all-pay auction should be seriously considered when one wants to organize a charity auction.
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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