Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228899 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 20-11
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function, and a minimally competitive prize profile with n􀀀1 identical prizes. The optimum can be achieved with a nested Tullock contest. We extend the model to allow for imperfect performance measurement and for heterogeneous agents. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function.
Schlagwörter: 
contest design
optimal contests
tournaments
JEL: 
D02
D82
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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