Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228881 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 279
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version, January 2021
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the underdog will try to moderate the favorite, while the strongest type of the favorite will try to discourage the underdog - so that the contest unravels. Self-disclosure is optimal even though a weak favorite or strong underdog may be induced to raise their efforts, i.e., show "dominant" or "defiant" reactions. To avert Pareto inferior unraveling, the favorite may prefer to shut down communication, but this is never the case for the underdog. We also consider partial information release, cheap talk, Bayesian persuasion, information design, correlation, and continuous types. Applications are discussed. The proofs employ novel arguments in monotone comparative statics and an improved version of Jensen's inequality.
Schlagwörter: 
Asymmetric contests
incomplete information
disclosure
strategic complements and substitutes
dominance and defiance
Bayesian persuasion
Jensen's inequality
Spieltheorie
Ungerechtigkeit
Auskunft
Dominanz
Abweichendes Verhalten
JEL: 
C72
D74
D82
J71
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
844.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.