Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228413
Authors: 
Asquith, Brian J.
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 19-296
Abstract: 
Rent control balances strong tenant protections with supply-side incentives for landlords. However, cities with rent control are also some of the United States' most unaffordable, prompting questions about how well these incentives are working. I examine how controlled landlords change their housing supply in response to price increases using a well-identified hyperlocal demand shock the privately operated commuter shuttle systems in San Francisco. Controlled landlords increased market withdrawal filings and became less likely to create vacancies via evictions in response to a shuttle stop placement. Policies raising barriers to market withdrawals prompted controlled landlords to respond my increasing their at-fault evictions.
Subjects: 
rent control
evictions
private transportation
LASSO
JEL: 
R31
R32
R52
K11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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