Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228413 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 19-296
Verlag: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI
Zusammenfassung: 
Rent control balances strong tenant protections with supply-side incentives for landlords. However, cities with rent control are also some of the United States' most unaffordable, prompting questions about how well these incentives are working. I examine how controlled landlords change their housing supply in response to price increases using a well-identified hyperlocal demand shock the privately operated commuter shuttle systems in San Francisco. Controlled landlords increased market withdrawal filings and became less likely to create vacancies via evictions in response to a shuttle stop placement. Policies raising barriers to market withdrawals prompted controlled landlords to respond my increasing their at-fault evictions.
Schlagwörter: 
rent control
evictions
private transportation
LASSO
JEL: 
R31
R32
R52
K11
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.97 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.