Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244
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dc.contributor.authorSander, Birgiten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:13:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:13:52Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2244-
dc.description.abstractGovernments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents but commit to policy rules.-
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x901en_US
dc.subject.jelC71-
dc.subject.jelC78-
dc.subject.jelD82-
dc.subject.jelH54-
dc.subject.jelK12-
dc.subject.jelP20-
dc.subject.jelP30-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.stwWohnungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWohnungsbaufinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivatisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTransaktionskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNeue Bundesländeren_US
dc.titleStrategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetzen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:901-
dc.identifier.printppn268012466en_US

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