Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222569
Authors: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 355
Abstract: 
This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
Subjects: 
blockchain
proof-of-work
Nash equilibrium
subgame perfection
selfish mining
JEL: 
C72
C73
D72
E42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
256.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.