Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216878
Authors: 
Barron, Kai
Nurminen, Tuomas
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics [ISSN:] 2214-8043 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Volume:] 88 [Year:] 2020 [Issue:] (Article No.:) 101542
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This paper experimentally studies two simple interventions that an authority figure might employ to promote cooperation in a public goods game when accurate feedback about contributions is not available. The first intervention aims to nudge participants to higher contribution levels by labeling contributions above a particular threshold as being ‘good’. Such a ‘norm-nudge’ is intended to provide subjects with a clear, valenced focal point upon which they can coordinate. The second intervention aims to exploit lying aversion to induce higher contributions by requiring subjects to announce how much they contributed. We find that the nudge leads to a striking increase in the cooperation rate. By contrast, the ex post announcement mechanism does not have a significant effect on the cooperation rate. We present suggestive evidence that the nudge we use provides subjects with a focal point, helping conditional cooperators to coordinate their contributions.
Subjects: 
cooperation
nudge
focal point
public good
lying
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C72
H41
Z13
Published Version’s DOI: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Files in This Item:





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.