Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202426
Authors: 
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
Ritschel, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper 331
Abstract: 
We show that economic decisions in strategic settings are co-determined by multiple behavioral rules. A simple model of intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity predicts testable differences depending on whether rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The predictions include non-trivial response time interactions reflecting the nature of the underlying processes, hence the model is not an as if explanation. In a laboratory experiment and two replications on Cournot oligopolies, we find direct evidence showing that decisions arise from the interaction between a deliberative myopic best reply rule and a more intuitive imitative rule.
Subjects: 
multiple behavioral rules
Cournot oligopoly
best reply
imitation
reinforcement
JEL: 
C72
C92
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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