Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200138
Authors: 
Nielsen, Kirby
Bhattacharya, Puja
Kagel, John H.
Sengupta, Arjun
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2019-207
Abstract: 
Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for the team outcome, ruling out explanations that team payoff structures drive b ehavior. Analysis of within-team discussions provides insight into the decision-making processes of first and second movers.
Subjects: 
trust game
hidden-action
non-binding communication
teams versus individuals
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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