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Autoren: 
Nielsen, Kirby
Bhattacharya, Puja
Kagel, John H.
Sengupta, Arjun
Datum: 
2019
Reihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2019-207
Zusammenfassung: 
Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for the team outcome, ruling out explanations that team payoff structures drive b ehavior. Analysis of within-team discussions provides insight into the decision-making processes of first and second movers.
Schlagwörter: 
trust game
hidden-action
non-binding communication
teams versus individuals
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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