Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/198901 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7541
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We incorporate prospect-theory preferences in a game-theoretic model to study voter turnout. We show that voter turnout is heavily affected by agents having subjective reference points with respect to the vote or abstain decision and their subjective probability weighting in the decision-making process. Using empirically based parameter values, we show that our model has lower prediction error than other game-theoretic models with standard expected-utility preferences. We also find that our model maintains desirable comparative statics effects and leads to higher turnout predictions in larger electorates.
Subjects: 
voting behavior
Downsian paradox
prospect-theory preferences
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.