Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/197202 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 691-729
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our condition, this set describes precisely those payoff vectors that arise in equilibrium for some private monitoring structure if either nonstationary monitoring or communication is allowed.
Subjects: 
Repeated games
private monitoring
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
537.75 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.