Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197163
Authors: 
Kamada, Yuichiro
Kojima, Fuhito
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 13 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 761-793
Abstract: 
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional constraints. We identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under distributional constraints and a matching problem with contracts.
Subjects: 
Matching with constraints
medical residency matching
school choice
stability
strategy-proofness
matching with contracts
hierarchy
JEL: 
C70
D47
D61
D63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
512.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.