Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194233
Authors: 
Angelova, Vera
Regner, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2018-009
Abstract: 
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability, we add the possibility for clients to make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation concerns achieves the highest rate of truthful advice, we observe a similar effect, when the bonus is combined with one of them. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation, decreasing moral hazard.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
principal-agent
expert services
deception game
sender-receiver game
reciprocity
reputation
experiments
voluntary payment
competition
JEL: 
C91
D03
D82
G20
I11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.