Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/194233 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2018-009
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability, we add the possibility for clients to make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation concerns achieves the highest rate of truthful advice, we observe a similar effect, when the bonus is combined with one of them. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation, decreasing moral hazard.
Schlagwörter: 
asymmetric information
principal-agent
expert services
deception game
sender-receiver game
reciprocity
reputation
experiments
voluntary payment
competition
JEL: 
C91
D03
D82
G20
I11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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