Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18684
Authors: 
Josephson, Jens
Waerneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1319
Abstract: 
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.
Subjects: 
work ethic
evolution
group selection
public goods
stochastic dynamics
JEL: 
Z13
M14
H41
D23
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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