Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/182368
Authors: 
Fuchs, Andreas
Müller, Angelika
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 2113
Abstract: 
Almost half of the world's states provide bilateral development assistance. While previous research takes the set of donor countries as exogenous, this article is the first to explore the determinants of aid donorship. We hypothesize that democratic institutions reduce poor countries' likelihood to initiate aid giving. On the contrary, the leadership of poor authoritarian regimes face fewer constraints that would hinder these governments to reap the benefits of a development aid program despite popular opposition. To test our expectations, we build a new global dataset on aid donorship since 1945 and apply an instrumental-variables strategy that exploits exogenous variation in regional waves of democratization. Our results confirm that the likelihood of a democratic country to start aid giving is more responsive to income than it is the case for authoritarian countries. Overall, democracies are - if anything - less rather than more likely to engage in aid giving.
Subjects: 
foreign aid
Official Development Assistance
aid donorship
aid institutions
new donors
democracy
selectorate theory
JEL: 
F35
H11
H87
O19
P33
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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