Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/17791 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1999
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 931
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a rationale for the coexistence of different systems of corporate governance based on the multitude of agency problems typically to be governed within a given firm. Because there are complementarity and substitution relationships between governance instruments, specific combinations of instruments which reinforce each other in minimizing agency costs fit together better than alternative combinations. We derive comparative static results showing how various governance instruments can be combined to form a coherent system of corporate governance and how changes in exogenous parameters can lead to simultaneous, systemic changes in the instruments used.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate governance
Complementarity
Agency problem
JEL: 
D23
G30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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