Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/177763 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1109
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the differential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade by Dockner and Haug (1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in Fujiwara (2010) and to show that a VER may arise in correspondence of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information such that competition is at least as strong as under open-loop rules. This result can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of conjectural variations due to Dockner (1992).
Subjects: 
differential games
intraindustry trade
VER
conjectural variations
JEL: 
C73
D43
F12
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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