Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/171967 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Citation: 
[Journal:] European journal of international relations [ISSN:] 1460-3713 [Volume:] 22 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Sage [Place:] Thousand Oaks, CA [Year:] 2016 [Pages:] 823-846
Publisher: 
Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA
Abstract: 
Advocates of a global democratic parliament have expressed hopes that this would not only legitimize global governance in procedural terms, but also bring about more cosmopolitan policies. They point to the European Parliament as an example of a successful real existing democratic parliament beyond the state with cosmopolitan intent. We analyse plenary debates in the United Nations General Assembly and the European Parliament about the issues of climate change, human rights, migration, trade and European integration between 2004 and 2011 to study the nature of opposition to cosmopolitanism within these two assemblies. We find more vocal and better-organized opposition to cosmopolitanism in the European Parliament than in the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate the plausibility that direct and more proportional mechanisms of delegation and accountability in the case of the European Parliament account for this observed difference. Should further research confirm these initial findings, advocates of a global democratic parliament may find that an empowered democratic World Parliament would support less cosmopolitan policies than the current United Nations General Assembly.
Subjects: 
Claims analysis
cleavage
cosmopolitanism
European Parliament
globalization
United Nations General Assembly
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Additional Information: 
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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