Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162423
Authors: 
Madison, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 220
Abstract: 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the market for unsecured credit literally dried out and collateral secured debt became the most widely used concept to coinsure against liquidity shocks. However, since financial assets are usually unproductive, the question comes up why institutions in the need of cash do not just simply sell these assets rather than using them as collateral. The aim of this paper is to develop a non-equivalence between secured credit and outright sale in the presence of asymmetric information and to show through a signaling game, why the willingness to deposit assets as collateral is a best response.
Subjects: 
Liquidity
Asymmetric Information
Collateral
Undefeated Equilibrium
JEL: 
D82
E44
G12
G21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
576.96 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.