Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159892
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1054
Abstract: 
The optimal design of two-part tariffs is investigated in a dynamic model where two firms belonging to the same supply chain invest in R&D activities to increase the quality of the final product. It is shown that the replication of the vertically integrated monopolist's performance can be attained using a TPT in which the fee is a linear function of either the upstream R&D effort or product quality itself. The possibility of relying on R&D figures appearing in the upstream firm's balance sheet is desirable as quality enhancement might not be observable or verifiable.
JEL: 
C73
L12
O31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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