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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1054
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
The optimal design of two-part tariffs is investigated in a dynamic model where two firms belonging to the same supply chain invest in R&D activities to increase the quality of the final product. It is shown that the replication of the vertically integrated monopolist's performance can be attained using a TPT in which the fee is a linear function of either the upstream R&D effort or product quality itself. The possibility of relying on R&D figures appearing in the upstream firm's balance sheet is desirable as quality enhancement might not be observable or verifiable.
JEL: 
C73
L12
O31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
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