Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159884
Authors: 
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1046
Abstract: 
Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.
JEL: 
C70
C90
D80
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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