Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159881
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 1043
Abstract: 
We study a class of games featuring payoff functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the infinite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on infinite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations.
JEL: 
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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