Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159276
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Baldini, Massimo
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 435
Abstract: 
We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics `a la Solow-Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics `a la Ramsey. In both settings, we evaluate the effects of (gross) profit taxation, proving that there exist tax rates yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dynamic analysis shows that, in general, profit taxation affects firms' decisions concerning capital accumulation and sales. In particular, it has pro-competitive effects provided that the extent of delegation is large enough.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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