Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155589
Authors: 
Khalmetski, Kiryl
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6347
Abstract: 
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.
Subjects: 
cost of lying
image concerns
cheating game
truth-telling
deception
JEL: 
D03
D82
D83
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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