Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155106
Authors: 
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 52. 2000
Abstract: 
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise. The reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise missing credible threat necessary to discipline collusive agreements: they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms find it convenient to punish it by reporting information to the Antitrust Authority.
Subjects: 
Antitrust law
leniency
self-reporting
cartels
collusion
bid-rigging
oligopoly
auctions
JEL: 
D43
D44
K21
L41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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