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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 52. 2000
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise. The reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise missing credible threat necessary to discipline collusive agreements: they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms find it convenient to punish it by reporting information to the Antitrust Authority.
Schlagwörter: 
Antitrust law
leniency
self-reporting
cartels
collusion
bid-rigging
oligopoly
auctions
JEL: 
D43
D44
K21
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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