Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150255
Title:

Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

Authors:
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Morimoto, Shuhei
Year of Publication:
2015
Citation:
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 10 [Year:] 2015 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 445-487
Abstract:
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule'' is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit{individual rationality}, and \textit{no subsidy for losers}. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.
Subjects:
Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
simultaneous ascending auction
strategy-proofness
efficiency
heterogeneous objects
non-quasi-linear preferences
JEL:
D44
D71
D47
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:
Document Type:
Article
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