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Autor:innen: 
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Morimoto, Shuhei
Datum: 
2015
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 445-487
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The ``minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule'' is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit{individual rationality}, and \textit{no subsidy for losers}. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.
Schlagwörter: 
Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
simultaneous ascending auction
strategy-proofness
efficiency
heterogeneous objects
non-quasi-linear preferences
JEL: 
D44
D71
D47
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
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