Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150226
Title:

# Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

Authors:
Calcagno, Riccardo
Sugaya, Takuo
Lovo, Stefano
Year of Publication:
2014
Citation:
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 409-434
Abstract:
We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.
Subjects:
Revision games
pre-opening
finite horizon
equilibrium selection
asynchronous moves
JEL:
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:
Document Type:
Article
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