Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150126 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2009 [Pages:] 127-163
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New York, NY
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n-1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property. It also offers a strategic foundation for the so-called "single-crossing version" of the Median Voter Theorem, by showing that the median ideal point can be implemented in dominant strategies by a direct mechanism in which every individual reveals his true preferences.
Subjects: 
Single-crossing
strategy-proofness
tops-only
peak rules
JEL: 
C72
D71
D78
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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