Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149295
Authors: 
Jr., Martin Dufwenberg
Dufwenberg, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 6208
Abstract: 
We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.
Subjects: 
cheating
lying
costs
audience
perceived cheating aversion
JEL: 
C72
D03
D82
D83
H26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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