Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/145433
Authors: 
Dutta, Bhaskar
Vohra, Rajiv
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2015-10
Abstract: 
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and has recently been re-formulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The farsighted stable set is based on a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional "moves" in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. However, it does not require that each coalition make a maximal move, i.e., one that is not Pareto dominated (for the members of the coalition in question) by another. Nor does it restrict coalitions to hold common expectations regarding the continuation path from every state. Consequently, when there are multiple continuation paths the farsighted stable set can yield unreasonable predictions. We resolve this difficulty by requiring all coalitions to have common rational expectations about the transition from one outcome to another. This leads to two related concepts: the rational expectations farsighted stable set (REFS) and the strong rational expectations farsighted stable set (SREFS). We apply these concepts to simple games and to pillage games to illustrate the consequences of imposing rational expectations for farsighted stability.
Subjects: 
stable sets
farsightedness
consistency
maximality
rational expectations
simple games
pillage games
JEL: 
C71
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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