Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/140816
Authors: 
Stark, Oded
Behrens, Doris A.
Wang, Yong
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
CMR Working Papers 32/90
Abstract: 
In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner's dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of 'swapping' individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology - of coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks - which measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and defectors a scenario is postulated under which 'programmed' migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run survival of cooperation.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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