Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127283
Authors: 
Eichberger, Jürgen
Kelsey, David
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 469
Abstract: 
Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium provides good predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however, actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attribute the robust deviations from Nash equilibrium to actual players’ considering not only marginal gains and losses but also total pay-offs. In this paper, we show that optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards strategic ambiguity may induce such behaviour.
Subjects: 
Ambiguity
coordination games
experiments
traveller’s dilemma
matching pennies
optimism
JEL: 
C72
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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