Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/126606
Authors: 
Huber, Samuel
Kim, Jaehong
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 211
Abstract: 
In the post-crisis period, increased regulation of financial intermediaries led to a significant decline in corporate bond market liquidity. In order to stabilize these markets, policy makers recently proposed that the trading of corporate bonds should be more centralized. In this paper, we show that a centralization of corporate bond markets always leads to an inferior outcome when compared with the initial over-the-counter structure. The regulator may achieve a superior allocation only if it is feasible for him to also affect market liquidity, by either increasing or decreasing it.
Subjects: 
monetary theory
over-the-counter markets
financial regulation
corporate bonds
liquidity
JEL: 
D47
D52
D62
E31
E44
E50
G11
G12
G28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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