Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118616
Authors: 
Schmid, Julia
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2015-206
Abstract: 
One reason for firms to voluntarily increase their environmental or social production standards is to prevent consumers from lobbying for stricter mandatory standards. In this sense, voluntary overcompliance serves as a Greek gift, as consumers might be worse off in the end. Strategically, a Greek gift deteriorates the consumer's incentive for lobbying and, as such, might be unkind. In many experiments it was shown that unkind actions which decrease the other's payoff are punished by negative reciprocal behavior. This paper experimentally investigates whether negative reciprocity can also be observed if unkind behavior is not directed at payoffs but rather at a deterioration of strategic incentives.
Subjects: 
experiments
voluntary agreements
overcompliance
learning
reciprocity
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
300.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.