Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/118616 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2015-206
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
One reason for firms to voluntarily increase their environmental or social production standards is to prevent consumers from lobbying for stricter mandatory standards. In this sense, voluntary overcompliance serves as a Greek gift, as consumers might be worse off in the end. Strategically, a Greek gift deteriorates the consumer's incentive for lobbying and, as such, might be unkind. In many experiments it was shown that unkind actions which decrease the other's payoff are punished by negative reciprocal behavior. This paper experimentally investigates whether negative reciprocity can also be observed if unkind behavior is not directed at payoffs but rather at a deterioration of strategic incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
experiments
voluntary agreements
overcompliance
learning
reciprocity
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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