Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112797
Authors: 
Hühne, Philipp
Meyer, Birgit
Nunnenkamp, Peter
Roy, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 2004
Abstract: 
Estimating two-step selection models, we find that more democratic governments are more likely to conclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and to agree to stricter investment provisions related to pre-establishment national treatment and investor-state dispute settlement in PTAs. This is surprising when considering the potentially high costs of litigation.
Subjects: 
preferential trade agreements (PTA)
investor-state dispute settlement
national treatment
democracy
JEL: 
F53
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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