Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/111200
Authors: 
Ewerhart, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, University of Zurich, Department of Economics 143
Abstract: 
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter ("2 < R < É") has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being "halfhearted," which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed, and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction.
Subjects: 
Tullock contest
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
analytical functions
JEL: 
C72
D72
C16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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