Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/107291 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5160
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a simple tournament model in which individuals auto-select into the contest on the basis of their commonly known strength levels, and privately observed strength-shocks (reflecting temporary deviations from observed levels). The model predicts that the participation rate should increase with the player's observed strength, and the total awarded prize amount. Furthermore, under certain conditions self-selection implies that participants with high observed strength levels have smaller expected strength-shocks than those with low levels. Consequently, the latter should play better than predicted and the former worse (given their observed strength). These predictions are confronted with data from a large chess tournament held in the USA. This tournament is divided into different sections, with players being able to play in the section to which their current chess rating (observed strength) belongs. As predicted, we find that within each section the participation probability increases with chess rating and prize amounts, and players with a relatively low (resp. high) rating are indeed the ones who have a better (resp. worse) relative performance.
Schlagwörter: 
chess
prizes
relative performance
selection
sorting
tournament
JEL: 
D82
L83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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