Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103095
Authors: 
Blumkin, Tomer
Margalioth, Yoram
Sharoni, Adi
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4962
Abstract: 
We examine the role of CSR as a mechanism for private provision of public goods. We argue that corporations are using CSR to signal high product quality and demonstrate that signaling gives rise to an excessive level of contributions that offsets the positive externality, which causes the under-provision of public goods. We analyze the tax policy implications of such assertion. Accounting for this offset would call for a decrease in (and potentially elimination of) the subsidy offered to corporations engaged in CSR activities.
Subjects: 
signaling
corporate social responsibility
public goods
Pigouvian taxation
JEL: 
H20
H40
K30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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