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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4962
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the role of CSR as a mechanism for private provision of public goods. We argue that corporations are using CSR to signal high product quality and demonstrate that signaling gives rise to an excessive level of contributions that offsets the positive externality, which causes the under-provision of public goods. We analyze the tax policy implications of such assertion. Accounting for this offset would call for a decrease in (and potentially elimination of) the subsidy offered to corporations engaged in CSR activities.
Schlagwörter: 
signaling
corporate social responsibility
public goods
Pigouvian taxation
JEL: 
H20
H40
K30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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